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Abstract: UK Feed-in Tariffs created a vibrant business ecosystem for the deployment of decentralised
renewable energy technologies while constituting a regressive tax and increasing inequality.
Business model innovation spurred by their withdrawal is providing valuable lessons for progressive
policy design. Using the case study of solar PV deployment on multi-occupancy social housing,
this paper reveals policy, business and organisational challenges that need to be overcome to address
fuel poverty and reduce inequality. Suitable ‘export’ and ‘local’ business models were identified
through a workshop and subsequently evaluated through qualitative thematic interview analysis.
The ‘local’ model compares favourably in terms of production costs and benefits for fuel poor tenants
but unfavourably in terms of transaction costs. Both models are considered equally susceptible to
changes in policy. Their success hinges upon third party intermediaries, peer-to-peer learning and a
supportive policy environment. This paper concludes with a policy recommendation to ensure that
energy justice lies at the heart of the UK’s transition to net-zero carbon through the fair distribution of
costs and benefits by including specific provisions to protect low-income groups.
Keywords: social housing; solar PV; feed-in tariff; community energy; multi-occupancy buildings;
fuel poverty; energy justice
1. Introduction
Fuel poverty has been identified as a serious energy justice problem in the UK, affecting 11.1%
of households in 2016 [1]. Fuel poor households have fuel costs above the national median level,
leaving them with a residual income below the official poverty line [2].
Domestic solar photovoltaic (PV) systems can reduce energy bills and create income for fuel
poor households through the generation, consumption and export of renewable energy (RE). The UK
government has supported growth in the PV sector, most notably through the Feed-in Tariff (FIT).
Through the Urban and Rural Community Energy Funds (UCEF/RCEF) and tax reliefs for RE projects,
the government has also facilitated the emergence of a vibrant community energy ecosystem [3].
By deploying solar PV systems at the community and household levels, community energy organisations
contribute to local decarbonisation and fuel poverty alleviation efforts.
However, many of these incentives have recently been scaled back, increasing financial risk for
PV projects [4]. This has complicated the already difficult task of enabling low-income and fuel poor
consumers to access the benefits of RE [5]. Supporting policies such as the FIT have also been criticised
for failing to provide a fair distribution of benefits to less wealthy socioeconomic groups [6]. As the
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FIT is financed through electricity bills and fuel poor households spend a disproportionately large
share of their income on energy, the levies that pay for it arguably constitute a regressive tax.
Many low-income families live in social housing, where the prevalence of fuel poverty is higher
than average, at 17% [7]. Accessing the benefits of PV is even more difficult under these conditions,
as the decision to install panels usually lies with the social landlord (local authority/housing association)
and a variety of technical, institutional and financial challenges may dissuade them [8], especially
when dealing with multi-occupancy buildings, where legal and organisational difficulties can impede
the introduction of PV [9].
However, technological advances and falling costs for PV, the development of supporting
technologies, such as smart meters and battery storage, and the growing supportive network of
community energy (CE) organisations provide new opportunities for supplying and sharing PV
electricity in multi-occupancy buildings [10]. A key enabling factor is the emergence of innovative
business models and financing mechanisms for subsidy-free PV projects. This research investigates
and compares these emerging models and their capacity to tackle fuel poverty in multi-occupancy
social housing schemes.
The key research questions are:
1. Which business models are viable for new PV installations on existing UK multi-occupancy social
housing schemes in a post-subsidy environment?
2. Of the models identified, how do they compare in terms of financial viability, transaction costs,
benefits to fuel poor tenants and susceptibility to future policy/regulatory changes?
3. How can social landlords effectively implement projects and how can energy policy support this?
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces the background literature. Section 3
describes the methods used to analyse the data, the results of which are presented in Section 4. Section 5
discusses these results with regards to policy implications.
2. Background
Fuel poverty has a range of social, economic and environmental causes, including high
energy prices, under-occupancy of homes and low incomes [11,12]. Old, poorly-maintained and
energy-inefficient homes are also responsible; the UK has the least efficient housing stock in Europe [13].
As RE technologies become more affordable and efficient, their potential to tackle fuel poverty
by reducing energy bills is becoming more apparent [14,15]. PV is well-suited for domestic use and
there have been significant advances in system productivity and durability. Installation costs have
also dropped considerably due to economies of scale, technological/manufacturing improvements and
increased availability of skilled installers [16].
2.1. Policy Context and Community Energy
Policies either explicitly or indirectly alleviating UK fuel poverty are mostly concerned with energy
demand. These include grants for vulnerable households (Winter Fuel Payment and Warm Home
Discount) and for energy efficiency improvements via the Energy Company Obligation (ECO) scheme,
the enforcement of minimum energy efficiency standards for privately rented homes, and targets for
social housing [8,17,18]. However, their direct impact on fuel poverty is poorly understood due the
lack of systematic ways to value multiple benefits in policy evaluations [19]. At the same time there is
a widespread absence of clarity, guidance and support regarding social housing [20,21].
The role of energy supply in addressing fuel poverty is less well understood. The FIT was
introduced in 2010 to promote the uptake of low-carbon electricity generation, by requiring energy
suppliers to pay an export and generation tariff to customers with eligible RE installations. The FIT was
intended to stimulate an immature RE market and tariff rates consequently declined systematically [22].
However, the FIT was widely considered regressive as it was funded through charges on consumer
energy bills but was only accessible to those wealthy enough to afford RE installations [6,22–24]. Of the
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£6.5bn raised through policy costs applied to household energy bills (such as the FIT) in 2016, only
17% of the funds were used to support low-income households [25]. The FIT has been replaced by
the Smart Export Guarantee (SEG), a scheme requiring large energy suppliers to offer payments to
customers who export electricity to the grid, although rates are often variable or very low compared
with the FIT [26].
Other UK policies supporting RE have specifically targeted CE projects, in which local communities
play an active part in control and/or ownership of supply assets and in reducing fuel poverty [4].
The UK’s 2014 Community Energy Strategy aimed for one million homes to be powered by CE
generation schemes by 2020 and referred to potential integration with social housing [14]. However,
this was scrapped in 2018, at only 6.7% progress towards the target [27]. The UCEF has also been
discontinued and RE projects can no longer access 30% tax relief through the Enterprise Investment
Scheme (EIS) and Seed Enterprise Investment Scheme (SEIS). These incentives helped de-risk CE
projects and encouraged investment by providing financial support at the early development stages [3].
In the absence of a supportive policy environment, business model innovation plays an increasingly
important role in creating new routes to market for sustainable energy supply solutions that help
address fuel poverty, especially regarding multi-occupancy buildings.
2.2. PV on Social Housing and Multi-Occupancy Buildings
Table 1 provides an overview of common drivers, barriers and opportunities for the uptake of
solar PV by social landlords.
Table 1. Common drivers, barriers and opportunities for the uptake of solar PV by social landlords.
Drivers Barriers Opportunities
Reducing tenants’ fuel
bills [7,28].
Transaction costs: administering projects,
training staff, engaging tenants, establishing
relationships with local installers [29,30].
Addressing fuel poverty: social rented
sector contains more vulnerable groups
than other tenures and 46% of tenants are in
the lowest income quintile [31].
Generating FIT
income [7,32].
Uncertainty of subsidies, particularly
concerning large projects with long lead
times [7,8,15].
Innovative financing, raising capital
through crowd-funding or shared
ownership with intermediaries such as CE
groups [14,15,33].
Positive publicity for
social landlord [15].
Difficulty of quantifying social and
environmental benefits [34].
Improving relationship between tenants
and landlord [15].
Improving property
Energy Performance
Certificates
(EPCs) [7,8,35].
Financial risk and
difficulty in raising capital [32,36].
Improving living standards and
comfort for tenants [7,37].
Reducing carbon
emissions [7,35,38,39].
High perceived risk and complexity, lack of
success stories [15,40].
Economies of scale: potential for large-scale
projects across multiple housing schemes
with substantial roof spaces [14,41].
Meeting local planning
regulations [20,39]. Ongoing maintenance costs [36,40].
Untapped potential: PV is predominantly
found in affluent areas [5,42].
Although there is a large body of literature on the uptake of solar PV by social landlords
(see Table 1), relatively few studies or policies highlight the potential supporting intermediary role of
CE organisations [14]. Specific issues related to PV projects on multi-occupancy buildings are also not
well-studied [9], even though 20% of UK homes are apartments [31].
Multi-occupancy buildings often have complex governance/management structures, which can
hinder PV projects. For example, some buildings may have a mixture of social tenants and leaseholders,
creating legal issues around co-ownership of the building and often necessitating lengthy consultations
with several different parties to approve new installations [43,44].
Another problem is the difficulty of distributing the benefits of a PV installation equally amongst
occupants. There are legal and regulatory issues with distributing electricity from a single array
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between individually-metered apartments [24,45]. Transferring power from a building-mounted PV
system to an apartment inside may incur network charges [9], and there are additional difficulties in
allocating free electricity produced by the array between occupants with different usage patterns [43].
3. Methodology
A literature review helped identify existing and potential post-subsidy PV project models. As the
FIT closed in April 2019 for the general public, and in April 2020 for CE, there were limited resources
available that directly related to the new policy landscape, and quantitative analyses of new models
were lacking. Therefore, transcript data from a workshop was studied to provide a longitudinal angle
to the evolution of business models.
The workshop titled ‘Regulating the Energy Sector: towards Peer-to-Peer Energy?’, involving 30
participants, was held on 13 July 2018 at the University of Bristol. It reviewed the key legislative and
regulatory decisions that shape the current energy system in the UK and explored changes necessary to
foster growth and stability of peer-to-peer (P2P) trading. In recorded breakout sessions, the workshop
attendees discussed the following scenarios: a P2P trading scenario where a large proportion of
households and community groups have RE-based generation capacity; a services scenario where
businesses and community groups consider providing energy services directly, instead of selling only
energy to consumers; a blockchain trading scenario where energy trading takes place on RE trading
platforms; and a third party control scenario where control over energy supply and service delivery is
ceded to organisations such as price comparison sites, trading platforms or energy service companies.
The attendees, with a background in community energy, innovative business models, decentralised
supply, energy policy and technology discussed various current and potential future tensions between,
and complementarities among, business models, social and environmental objectives, and policy and
regulation. In total, over 10 h of semi-structured qualitative research data was gathered. This data was
transcribed and evaluated by clustering data around key topics. Relevant to this research were the key
topics of ‘poverty’, ‘business models’, ‘PPA’ (power purchase agreement), ‘contract’ and ‘benefit’.
Workshop data helped identify two emerging supply business models (‘local’ and ‘export’) which
promise to deliver social and environmental objectives within the current policy and regulatory
environment. The initial frameworks were based on models discussed by workshop participants, with
supporting ideas from literature [45,46]. The models were adapted for a multi-occupancy social housing
scenario, using findings from other literature, preliminary discussions with industry experts and one
of the authors’ prior experiences from working in the sustainability division of a housing association.
Interviews and workshop proceedings were chosen as the primary qualitative data sources due
to the transitional state of the UK’s RE sector brought about by FIT termination. In the absence of
quantitative data, analysing insights from industry experts presented the most effective method of
answering the key research questions [47].
Interviews were arranged by contacting experts in England, including representatives from CE
organisations, local authorities, housing associations and energy suppliers (see Table 2). These contacts
were found by searching online for organisations involved in PV projects on social housing or were
recommended by other interviewees; three contacts (WR, RM and JC) were also former colleagues of
one of the authors.
Interviews lasted approximately 40–60 min and were semi-structured (see Box 1), to avoid
pigeon-holing participants and to give them flexibility to expand on certain topics [48]. Interview
recordings, transcripts and analysis outputs were kept on a password-protected cloud storage account
and deleted on completion of the research. Every interviewee was sent their interview transcript by
email and given the opportunity to ask questions and request anonymity.
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Table 2. Interviewee list.
Interviewee Initials Job Title Organisation Organisation Type
AE ERDF Project Manager Bioregional Environmental consultancy
AF Resilience Manager Frome Town Council Local authority
AN Project management role Anonymous CE organisation
CN Director Community Energy South CE organisation
DT Renewables Lead Plymouth Energy Community CE organisation
DS Lockleaze Project Lead Low Carbon Gordano CE organisation
JC Energy & Environment Officer Hyde Housing association
KE Director Brighton & Hove Energy Services Cooperative CE organisation
LP Innovation and Strategy Manager Bristol Energy Municipal energy supplier
LW Director SE2 Environmental consultancy
LE Community Energy Project Manager Bristol City Council Local authority
MW Energy Innovation Manager Bioregional Environmental consultancy
ND Director Adecoe Energy/housing consultancy
RM Director SE2 Environmental consultancy
WR Head of Sustainability Southern Housing Group Housing association
Box 1. Questionnaire.
1. Following FIT termination, what do you consider viable business models for PV projects aimed at tackling
fuel poverty for social housing tenants in multi-occupancy buildings?
2. Between ‘local’ and ‘export’, which do you think:
a. Is most financially viable?
b. Has higher transaction costs?
c. Could provide the greatest benefits for fuel poor tenants?
d. Is most susceptible to future changes in policy/regulation?
3. How could social landlords ensure successful project implementation?
Thematic analysis of the qualitative data identified key recurring themes emerging from interviews,
using the NVivo software (Version 12, QSR International (UK) Limited, London, UK) and the steps
outlined by Braun and Clarke [49]. Recorded interviews were transcribed and codes were created to
understand the central themes from responses to questions 2a–d. Paragraphs from transcripts were
assigned to one (or more) of these codes on NVivo, excluding comments from the interviewer and
those unrelated to the research questions.
4. Results
Four broad post-FIT PV models applicable to multi-occupancy social housing emerged from
interviews, but only ‘local’ and ‘export’ were analysed in detail.
Six interviewees raised the option of transferring power from a rooftop PV array on a multi-
occupancy social housing scheme directly to participating tenants via a private wire connection or a
microgrid, circumventing the distribution grid and the associated network charges [45]. This model
was not analysed in detail because legal issues emerge if social landlords wish to sell energy to tenants
without involving a licensed supplier [45] and retrofitting additional wiring and submeters is expensive
and disruptive. Interview data suggests such models are better suited to new builds.
Four interviewees suggested models based on providing energy efficiency measures/installations
and generating income on a ‘pay-as-you-save’ basis, such as the Dutch ‘whole house’ retrofit model,
Energiesprong [50]. These were not analysed in depth as many social landlords have already
implemented basic efficiency measures, partly through the ECO and Decent Homes programmes [7].
Properties that are still underperforming are often ‘hard to treat’ and, therefore, good candidates for
‘whole house’ retrofits. However, such models (including Energiesprong) are immature in the UK,
making projects unaffordable for most social landlords without subsidies [13].
Analysis of the workshop transcript identified model elements that were broadly favoured by
participants, which formed the basis of the ‘local’ and ‘export’ models. The ‘local’ model uses concepts
of localised generation and supply found in the ‘Lockleaze Loves Solar’ project, whilst the ‘export’
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model involves power purchase agreements (PPAs) discussed in the workshop. These models are
comparatively more bounded than ‘pay-as-you-save’ business models while requiring less dedicated
infrastructure than private wire/microgrid solutions.
4.1. ‘Local’
‘Local’ involves the sale of power generated by a PV system to tenants living inside the building
(see Figure 1). UK regulator Ofgem’s (Office of Gas and Electricity Markets) current ‘supplier hub’
model means that consumers must buy energy from a licensed energy supplier [51]. Consequently,
this model requires participating tenants to switch to a partner energy supplier to purchase energy
generated on-site. In reality, tenants would receive electricity from a variety of sources from the grid
as normal, but the energy supplier would offer a specialised tariff to these tenants. This may be a
time-of-use tariff, which varies in price depending on the PV system output. Excess electricity demand
which cannot be matched by the system would be sold to tenants (probably at a higher price) by the
supplier [45]. Surplus generated electricity would be exported to the grid for little or no financial
return, so maximising on-site self-consumption is important for this model’s success [35].Energies 2020, 13, x 7 of 17 
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Figure 1. ‘Local’ flowchart, adapted from ‘Figure 15: y ical self-consumption business model’ in
Dunlop and Roesch [45]. Additions of tenant engagement, powering communal areas and time-of-use
tariffs derived from interview and workshop data.
Optional elements could be added to maximise self-consumption of generated electricity:
• A tenant engagement programme could convince tenants to switch to the partner energy supplier
and help them understand how to adapt their energy usage to maximise their benefit from cheap
electricity. For example, ergy prices would f ll on a sunny day when PV output is igh, so
encouraging tenants to run household appliances during these times would lp th m to save
money. ‘Smart’ appliances could be scheduled to turn on automatically when generation output
is high [52].
• A private wire connection from the PV system to the communal electricity circuit (which may power
the communal lighting, heating, security systems and lifts) helps to maximise on-site consumption
and avoid grid charges [45]. Savings made here could reduce the tenants’ service charge.
• Battery storage could be integrated to store energy generate on-site at times of hig supply
and low demand. This could power communal facilities or be used by residents at times of
high demand.
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Energy Local have used a similar model to create a localised cooperative in Bethesda, North Wales,
involving a hydropower scheme, over 100 households and Co-operative Energy as the partner supplier.
Initial surveys indicate reductions on electricity bills of 19–29%, depending on how well households
match their consumption to local generation. [53].
4.2. ‘Export’
‘Export’ involves the sale of electricity generated by a PV system to a different building/organisation,
rather than to the building’s occupants (see Figure 2). The buyer should have a high energy demand,
for example a residential block, university, hospital or utility provider, such as a rail network or water
company [54]. The transaction is carried out via a PPA, which is an often long-term contract between
the generator and buyer [45]. Power transfer can be achieved by a private wire connection if the buyer
is geographically close to the social housing scheme, or via an intermediary energy supplier, who
purchases power from the social landlord and sells it to the buyer on a specialised tariff that links the
price with the PV system output (known as a sleeved PPA) [10].Energies 2020, 13, x 8 of 17 
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Figure 2. ‘Export’ flowchart adapted from ‘Figure 23: Typical onsite private wire PPA business model
structure’ in Dunlop and Roesch [45]. Additions of community benefit fund, powering communal
areas and tenant benefits derived from interview and workshop data.
Tenants do not directly benefit from power generated on-site. Instead, profits from energy sales
are directed into a community benefit fund (CBF), which could be used to install energy efficiency
measures, upgrade insulation or provide energy advice to tenants [3]. Additionally, the PV system
could power communal facilities (as with ‘local’) and reduce tenants’ service charges.
‘Export’ could utilise a special purpose vehicle (SPV) to reduce transaction c sts associated with
negot ating the PPA. These are companies created for a specific fin cial transaction [45]. They are
time-consumin to establish, but can be used repeatedly for similar transactions/proj cts. SPVs allow
multiple organisations to work in partnership and hold assets separately from stakeholders, therefore
minimising the risk to investors [7].
A similar model is being used in the ‘Riding Sunbeams’ project, which is investigating the potential
for PV to power the UK’s rail network. Power can be sold from multiple PV installations to Network
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Rail using PPAs. The model is expected to operate subsidy-free, generate a CBF, reduce the Southern
Region’s traction electricity bill by 4% and reduce CO2 emissions by 13% [55].
4.3. Thematic Analysis of ‘Local’ and ‘Export’
Tables 3–5 compare the key themes identified for ‘local’ and ‘export’ through analysis of
interview transcripts.
Table 3. Financial viability themes for both models from interview transcript analysis.
Financial
Viability Themes ‘Local’ Model ‘Export’ Model
Supply
contract length
• Consumer protection regulations mean that tenants
could leave supply contracts after a year, representing
a significant risk.
• If electricity prices are low enough a certain
proportion of tenants are likely to remain on-supply.
However, this depends on them feeling engaged with
the project and understanding how to adapt their
energy usage [15,38].
• “Ofgem will at some point review this prioritisation of
consumer choice, because it goes against the possibility of
getting long-term contracts necessary to secure investment
to develop renewable energy projects”—CN.
• Typical PPA contracts are around a decade long and
consequently offer more financial certainty [46].
• Long contracts could become a disadvantage, as
buyers could relocate, alter their power demand or go
bankrupt, and policy changes could facilitate new
and more profitable business models [45].
• Ensuring contracts cover as many eventualities as
possible and are signed with well-established buyers
would help mitigate risk [46].
Economies of scale
• The larger the project, the more individual tenants
need to be engaged.
• “The problem with the local model is that complexity rises
proportionately to scale, whereas with the PPA model it’s
the opposite”—CN.
• ‘Export’ may only be viable for large projects, as it is
not worth negotiating a complex PPA for a low-value,
low-power exchange.
• Fortunately, multi-occupancy buildings often have
large roof spaces and social landlords often have
multiple suitable schemes [15].
• Social landlords could sell power from PV systems
across multiple schemes via a single PPA using
‘virtual power plant’ platforms which aggregate
multiple generation sources [56].
Battery storage
• Battery storage could enhance financial viability
through increased on-site power consumption.
• Capital costs would rise, and indoor battery
installations can cause disruption and encroachment
on living space.
• “The storage part is key. If you can get high on-site
consumption you can make solar work in terms of a
business case quite easily...you could buy a larger battery
and have it for a whole apartment block”—DT.
• Battery storage is only necessary if there is surplus
power generation.
• Surplus could be avoided by finding a power
purchaser with power requirements that closely align
with times of peak generation or that greatly exceed
the power being generated.
Smart meter
difficulties
• Standard SMETS1/2 smart meters may not support
half-hourly settlements and generation metering
aspects of ‘local’ [10].
• Paying for the installation of export or advanced
smart meters may be necessary, although planned
upgrades to existing smart meters could resolve this.
Theme not applicable for this model.
Table 4. Transaction cost themes for both models from interview transcript analysis.
Transaction
Cost Themes ‘Local’ Model ‘Export’ Model
Tenant engagement
• Allocating/training staff to encourage tenants to switch
energy supplier and adapt their energy usage would incur
transaction costs [32].
• Widespread reluctance to switch energy suppliers [27], and
low-income customers may be particularly less inclined to
do so [57].
• Time-of-use tariffs would also need explaining, although
low-income tenants are more likely to be at home during
daytime hours and are therefore well-suited to maximising
the benefits of such tariffs [2].
• “If residents need to change supplier, they’re going to want to
know how much less they will pay. Start bringing in time-of-use
tariffs and people may lose interest because it’s too
complicated”—JC.
Theme not applicable for this model.
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Table 4. Cont.
Transaction
Cost Themes ‘Local’ Model ‘Export’ Model
Number of
parties involved
• Social landlords may enter contracts with many tenants, an
energy supplier and intermediaries (such as CE
organisations) within a single project.
• Maintaining relationships with so many stakeholders
would require considerable staff time and incur transaction
costs [15].
• Straightforward relationship of selling power to a
single buyer.
• Less time-consuming and complicated than selling
power to multiple tenants, incurring lower
transaction costs.
• “Export is easier because you don’t have to sign on the
customers”—KE.
Supply contract
complexity Theme not applicable for this model.
• Specific expertise needed to broker good value PPAs
as contracts are complicated and prices set in various
ways (e.g., fixed and tracker PPAs) [10,45].
• Social landlords are unlikely to be familiar with
negotiating PPAs, although SPVs and P2P trading
platforms could simplify and automate the process.
• “If you’re good at negotiating partnerships and brokering
deals with the private sector then maybe you look that way.
A template contract would make it more reassuring”—LW.
Integrating
electricity bills into
service charges
• Avoid tenant engagement and short contract problems by
including electricity bills in tenants’ service charges.
• Convincing tenants to sign new tenancy contracts and
managing billing may be challenging [7].
• Option better suited to new builds, where the terms can be
included in the initial tenancy contracts.
Theme not applicable for this model.
Table 5. Tenant benefit themes for both models from interview transcript analysis.
Tenant
Benefit Themes ‘Local’ Model ‘Export’ Model
How do
tenants benefit
• Tenants have reduced electricity bills as soon as they join
the new tariff, leaving them with more disposable income.
• “The local model directly translates into savings for
tenants”—JC.
• CBF could be spent on interventions to reduce
tenant’s energy bills, such as LED lighting,
draught-proofing, improved insulation, new heating
systems and energy/budgeting advice provision.
• CBF could be easily misallocated without appropriate
ring-fencing and management.
• “Ensure the community fund does something meaningful
and doesn’t get eaten up in administration fees, which does
happen sometimes”—LP.
Scale of benefits
• Savings depend on PV system performance, tariff pricing
and ability of tenants to adapt their energy usage [15].
However, subsidy cuts have made it difficult to give on-site
customers a discounted tariff [58].
• Energy generation/efficiency installations can result in
tenants increasing their energy usage: a ‘rebound
effect’ [41,59].
• Tight margins may lead to small or non-existent CBFs.
The amount that CE organisations raised for CBFs
varies greatly, with some raising below £10,000 and
others raising over £50,000 [3].
• Larger CBFs are often raised by well-established CE
organisations, supporting the argument for social
landlords to engage experienced intermediaries.
• Social landlords may focus on repaying loans for
project capital costs, causing a time lag of several
years before tenants benefit from a CBF [7].
• “The margins are tighter than before, so that community
benefit pot isn’t going to be as large”—DT.
Social equity
• Occupants of buildings unsuitable for PV installation may
be left at a disadvantage. However, ‘local’ does not
necessarily exclude non-residents: Energy Local Clubs
accept anyone in their specific geographical location.
• CBFs enable equal sharing of benefits amongst a
community rather than between tenants fortunate
enough to live in a building with PV installed [60].
• CBFs could be added to a wider fuel poverty fund
managed by the social landlord and spent on
efficiency upgrades for buildings with low EPC
ratings, damp/condensation issues or high prevalence
of fuel poverty.
• “Efficient buildings with solar panels have already got
relatively low costs, they could use that benefit to help older
buildings without solar panels . . . Target buildings with
the lowest EPC band and residents with real financial
difficulties”—WR.
Community
empowerment
• Community-building impacts such as job creation and
upskilling (if tenants are involved in
installation/management).
• Empowerment through participation in local energy
generation and improved social cohesion through
involvement in a shared project [5,36,61,62].
• Improving tenants’ environmental awareness and
encouraging behaviour change.
• ‘Export’ could offer community-building impacts,
although tenants may be less interested in getting
involved if electricity is being sold to a third party.
• “Creating stronger and more resilient communities...It’s
the whole value of building community around a shared
project”—AN.
5. Discussion
Figure 3 shows that six interviewees considered ‘local’ more financially viable than ‘export’, while
an equal number were unsure or thought both were equal. This could be explained by concerns
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about tight margins in ‘export’ and the difficulty of brokering good value PPAs without subsidies
(see Tables 3 and 4). However, many interviewees thought the financial viability of ‘export’ would
improve with economies of scale and when PPA frameworks and SPVs become more established
(see Table 3). Short contracts with tenants and smart metering issues could impact the financial viability
of ‘local’, but interviewees presented solutions to these issues and thought battery storage would
improve prospects (see Table 3).
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Figure 3. Interviewe responses to co paring ‘local’ and ‘export’ models.
Sev n interviewe s thought ‘export’ l l er transaction costs than ‘local’ because of
the simpler relationship of P As with a sin l er and the potential use of SPVs and 2P
trading (see Table 4). Only two intervie ees t ce for ‘local’ on thi subject. This can be
attributed to he time-consuming task of enga ing tenants in ‘local’, although interviewees pointed out
that these issu s are easi r to tackle in new builds (see Table 4).
Eight interviewees vie e ‘local’ as offering superior potential benefits to fuel poor tenants,
as it directly reduces tenants’ electricity bills and offers wider co munity and educational benefits
relating to involvement in local energy generation that may be harder to achieve through ‘export’,
where tenants do not directly engage with RE generation (see Table 5). The variety of potential uses for
a CBF and the fact that funds could be spread equally in a community or directed to those in most need
were overshadowed by concerns that the CBF could be too small for a significant impact, misspent or
lost in administrative costs (see Table 5).
Thirteen interviewees indicated that both models were equally susceptible to changes in
policy/regulation or that they were unsure, as both are subject to similar regulatory/policy
requirements [45].
5.1. The Need for Case-by-Case Analysis
Analysis has identified benefits and disadvantages of both models, although it indicates that each
model is appropriate in different scenarios.
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As ‘local’ is reliant on high levels of self-consumption and tenants adapting their energy usage
behaviour, it may be best implemented in housing schemes where occupants are at home during the
daytime (see Table 4). These could be sheltered housing for elderly residents, care homes or schemes
with high numbers of unemployed residents [15,37]. Another suitable scenario is properties with
electric heating such as heat pumps. Immersion heaters and new storage heater technologies can also
be used in conjunction with domestic PV systems to charge up when PV output is high [63].
‘Export’ may be best suited to larger schemes, schemes located near potential large-scale power
consumers or a mass rollout of PV across a social landlord’s stock, where engaging numerous tenants
could incur high transaction costs (see Table 4). Current PPA models are most commonly used on
large commercial projects or solar farms, while domestic and small commercial projects tend to use
self-consumption models [46].
Maximising the use of PV to power communal facilities inside the housing scheme would be
beneficial for the implementation of both models, as suggested by six interviewees. Therefore, both
models are well suited to large buildings with high communal power demand, such as those with lifts,
mechanical ventilation and heat recovery systems, advanced security systems and electric heaters in
communal areas [45].
5.2. Recommendations for Social Landlords
There are various ways social landlords could improve prospects for PV projects on their
housing stock. Firstly, support from third party intermediaries such as local CE groups, energy
agencies/consultancies, local authorities and energy suppliers has been identified as an important
enabler of successful PV projects on social housing [14,15,34,61]. CE organisations often have the
expertise and motivation needed to enable successful PV projects [14,34,64]. Their trusted community
connections make them well placed to assist with tenant engagement, which is particularly useful
if there is a lack of trust between tenants and the social landlord [65]. Failing to involve tenants can
lead to their losing interest, misunderstanding the new technology and failing to realise its potential
benefits [38,39,61].
Engaging intermediaries can also unlock new finance options [66]. For example, CE organisations
are often experienced in raising money through community share offers or crowd-funding [36]. Their
position as organisations with community/environmental objectives can also attract support from
social/environmental impact investors [67].
Social landlords should collaborate to share technical knowledge and best practice, encourage
P2P learning and pool resources such as document/project frameworks [5]. ‘Umbrella’ organisations
could assist by creating a national RE forum for social landlords [28]. Social landlords should also
train their frontline staff on advising tenants on getting the best from new and existing PV systems [7].
Finally, integrating robust monitoring of CO2 savings, financial benefits to tenants and wider
community benefits into future projects would provide evidence on the benefits of small-scale RE
projects and bolster the case for government support [60]. Installing smart generation/export meters
would enable accurate monitoring of project performance, and could also benefit tenants [8].
5.3. Policy Implications
Standing charges for all network users are under review and regulators need to strike a fine
balance between the even distribution of costs and facilitating investment in distributed RE and storage
technology [68]. Changes to the ‘supplier hub’ model are also being considered, as it may hinder
innovation (such as P2P trading) and RE diffusion [51]. Enabling buying and selling electricity locally,
rather than through a licenced supplier, is also being considered (see the 2020 Local Electricity Bill). This
has the potential to reduce transaction costs for both models, as the need to engage intermediary energy
suppliers currently represents an obligatory financial and logistical hurdle for both. The SEG is variable
and not guaranteed, and conveys a minimal and equal advantage to both models presented here.
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The alternative is to incentivise consumers to reduce their electricity demand, for example via
time-of-use tariffs. To ensure vulnerable groups can benefit, specialised reduced tariffs could be offered
to the most deprived areas, as measured by the Index of Multiple Deprivation. To allow households
that cannot afford solar PV, electric vehicles and battery storage to benefit from time-of-use tariffs,
subsidies could be provided to low-income households for installing energy-efficient smart appliances
and heating systems that automatically power up when electricity prices are low [69]. These could
include smart washing machines, fridge-freezers, electric immersion heater timers and night storage
heaters [52]. Such demand response and flexibility can also benefit network operators, which might
provide an additional source of income if these can be aggregated [70].
Support for CE to help tackle fuel poverty could be expanded by reinstating EIS and SEIS [3].
Reinstating the UCEF could be particularly beneficial for projects on multi-occupancy social housing
schemes, which are commonly found in urban areas. These, however, would not address the legal
barriers to supplying occupants with energy generated on-site [24].
To make a real difference to fuel poor households, and especially those in multi-occupancy
social housing, ownership of (remote) generation assets could be transferred through ‘buy as you use’
arrangements. So instead of haemorrhaging money, households would become asset owners through
their expenditure (similar to a mortgage). Energy policymakers and regulators could enable such
models by simplifying complex billing arrangements in return for a right to curtail any export to the
grid. This can ensure that additional RE generation capacity can be installed to address fuel poverty
without overloading local grid infrastructures.
Upgrading, draught proofing and insulating the building fabric of homes needs to be prioritised
and closely coordinated with the installation, operation and management of sustainable and affordable
heating systems. Cash grant schemes such as Winter Fuel Payments and the Warm Home Discount
help ease the pressure on certain fuel poor households but do not tackle the root problem.
Bearing in mind rising inequalities, any support schemes need to apply the ability-to-pay principle
by funding policy costs through general taxation or taxes on businesses to help reduce the financial
burden on the less wealthy [71]. It is estimated that transitioning to a general taxation approach for
funding energy subsidies would decrease costs for 70% of UK households [25].
The UK’s Renewable Heat Incentive is an example of such a policy paid for through general
taxation. Targeting such policies at (multi-occupancy) social housing could reduce energy expenditure
through lower energy bill levies and modern heating systems. In their absence, the continuous funding
of energy efficiency improvements through the ECO scheme, whilst making such improvements
mandatory for social landlords (by extending MEES to apply to social housing, for example), can
ensure that even the lowest-earning households would be able to afford to heat their homes and
live comfortably.
Ultimately, there is a need for greater institutional commitment to fuel poverty alleviation measures
which acknowledge and incorporate the financial, social and environmental value of energy saving and
local supply. ‘Local’ and ‘export’ have emerging potential and could be combined with pay-as-you-save
models and grid flexibility services to benefit vulnerable groups. However, a shift towards a more
cooperative and collaborative form of energy governance is required to realise their full commercial
potential and contribute to the development of more sustainable and just energy systems.
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